Comment on ‘impact of current climate proposals’ by Ward, Robert E. T.
Comment on ‘Impact of Current Climate
Proposals’
Robert E.T. Ward
London School of Economics and Political Science
Lomborg suffers from a fundamental methodological ﬂaw
which means that it could not fulﬁl its aim, stated in the
‘Abstract’, to investigate ‘the temperature reduction impact
of major climate policy proposals implemented by 2030’.
Projections of global mean surface temperature for the
period up to 2100 are based on cumulative annual global
emissions of greenhouse gases. While Lomborg purports to
analyze the temperature changes associated with policies
affecting emissions up to 2030, the author fails to acknowl-
edge that the temperature projections to 2100 are deter-
mined primarily by assumptions that are made about
cumulative annual global emissions over the 70-year period
after 2030, rather than cumulative annual emissions during
the period up to 2030.
The results cited by Lomborg are almost entirely due to
the assumptions he makes about the post-2030 annual
emissions from the US, EU and China. In each of these
cases, annual emissions are assumed not to reduce any fur-
ther, and in most of his ‘scenarios’, to rise. In most of his
‘scenarios’, emissions are assumed to rise by the end of the
century to levels that reverse completely the effects of emis-
sions reductions by 2030, and in some cases they also
reverse the effects of emissions reductions that have
occurred in the period up to 2015. As such, most of the
‘scenarios’ used by Lomborg assume that climate policies
are abandoned or reversed after 2030, and it is this assump-
tion that primarily determines the projected global mean
surface temperature in 2100. Hence, Lomborg does not
investigate ‘the temperature reduction impact of major cli-
mate policy proposals implemented by 2030’.
In the case of the US, Figure 3 of Lomborg illustrates the
assumptions made about annual emissions in relation to the
pledge contained in the ‘intended nationally determined
contribution’ (INDC) that was submitted to the secretariat of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) on 31 March 2015.1 The INDC indicates
that ‘the US intends to achieve an economy-wide target of
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26–28 per cent
below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to
reduce its emissions by 28 per cent’. Figure 3 shows this
reduction in emissions. However, the INDC also notes: ‘This
target is consistent with a straight line emission reduction
pathway from 2020 to deep, economy-wide emission reduc-
tions of 80 per cent or more by 2050’. Lomborg disregards
this statement, without justiﬁcation. Instead, he assumes for
his ‘Optimistic USINDC’ scenario that annual emissions by
the US remain at about the same level of around 4.6 giga-
tonnes of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (Gt CO2e) for the period
between 2025 and 2100. For his ‘Pessimistic USINDC’, Lom-
borg assumes that annual emissions by the US rise asymp-
totically to just under 6 Gt CO2e, exceeding current annual
emissions levels during the 2070s. Hence this scenario com-
pletely reverses emissions reductions to be achieved by
2030 as well as emissions reductions achieved over about
the past ﬁve years. Neither of these scenarios corresponds
to expected policies beyond 2030.
In the case of the 28 member states of the EU, Figure 7
of Lomborg shows the assumptions made about annual
emissions in relation to the pledge contained in the INDC
that was submitted to the secretariat of the UNFCCC on 6
March 2015.2 The INDC indicates that ‘the EU and its Mem-
ber States are committed to a binding target of an at least
40 per cent domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 2030 compared to 1990’. Figure 7 shows this
reduction. However, the INDC also states that the 2030 tar-
get is ‘in line with the EU objective, in the context of nec-
essary reductions according to the IPCC by developed
countries as a group, to reduce its emissions by 80–95 per
cent by 2050 compared to 1990’. Lomborg ignores this
statement, without justiﬁcation. Instead, he assumes for his
‘Optimistic EUINDC’ scenario that annual emissions by the
EU rise gradually after 2030, exceeding current levels dur-
ing the 2070s and reaching about 4.6 Gt CO2e by 2100.
Hence this scenario assumes the reversal of emissions cuts
achieved by 2030 as well as the reversal of reductions
since about 2010. For his ‘Pessimistic EUINDC’, Lomborg
assumes that annual emissions by the EU climb even more
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steeply, exceeding current levels in about 2040 and even-
tually rising to about 6.7 Gt CO2e by 2100. Hence this sce-
nario reverses all emissions cuts achieved since 1990 until
the present day and those intended by 2030, with emis-
sions due to be almost 50 per cent higher by the end of
the century compared with today, and about 100 per cent
higher than the target for 2030. Neither of these scenarios
corresponds to expected policies beyond 2030.
In the case of China, Figure 9 of Lomborg shows the
assumptions made about annual emissions in relation to the
pledge contained in the INDC that was submitted to the
secretariat of the UNFCCC on 30 June 2015.3 The INDC indi-
cates that China pledges ‘to lower carbon dioxide emissions
per unit of GDP by 60 per cent to 65 per cent from the
2005 level’. Figure 9 shows a projection for annual emissions
resulting from a 60 per cent cut in emissions intensity by
2030. However, the INDC also pledges that China will
‘achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around
2030 and making bets efforts to peak early’. Lomborg
ignores this statement, without justiﬁcation. Instead, he
assumes for his ‘Optimistic China INDC’ scenario that annual
emissions by China continue to rise gradually after 2030
until about 2060, exceeding 20 Gt CO2e from about 2050 up
to 2100, compared with 11 Gt CO2e today and about 16 Gt
CO2e in 2030. Hence this scenario assumes that emissions
will increase by about a third after 2030, instead of reaching
their peak in 2030. For his ‘Pessimistic China INDC’, Lomborg
assumes that annual emissions by China climb even more
steeply, to about 20 Gt CO2e during the 2040s and reaching
about 22 Gt CO2e from 2060 up to 2100. Hence this sce-
nario assumes that emissions increase by more than 45 per
cent after 2030 instead of peaking. Neither of these scenar-
ios corresponds to expected policies beyond 2030.
Overall, Lomborg’s ‘optimistic’ scenarios for the US, EU
and China assume that their collective annual emissions rise
from about 23 Gt CO2e in 2030 to more than 29 Gt CO2e in
2100. His ‘pessimistic’ scenarios mean collective emissions
would rise to more than 34.5 Gt CO2e. It is clear that the
post-2030 assumptions largely obliterate the beneﬁts of the
emissions cuts up to 2030. It is for this reason that Lomborg
projects that his ‘Optimistic World INDC’ scenario means a
rise in global mean surface temperature of 4.5°C by 2100,
with the ‘Pessimistic World INDC’ leading to an even bigger
rise. The overwhelming majority of this warming is due to
the assumptions by Lomborg about post-2030 emissions.
These temperature rises far exceed the warming projected
by other studies that have analyzed the INDCs. For instance,
the International Energy Agency (2015) and G€utschow et al.
(2015) have both projected that they would lead to a warm-
ing of 2.7°C by 2100. Indeed, both ’World INDC’ scenarios
described by Lomborg far exceed the temperature rises pro-
jected in ‘business as usual’ scenarios that omit the impact
of the INDCs (e.g. G€utschow et al., 2015). This shows just
how extreme the assumptions about post-2030 emissions
made by Lomborg really are – they suggest that the INDCs
would lead to an increase in warming compared with sce-
narios without the INDCs. Lomborg hides this fact by choos-
ing to compare his scenarios against the most extreme
scenario (RCP8.5) described by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2013), which assumes strong
growth in annual emissions throughout this century, leading
to carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere of more
than 900 parts per million by 2100 (compared with the pre-
industrial concentration of 280 parts per million and about
400 parts per million today) and a mean rise in global sur-
face temperature of 4.3°C.
Hence, a comparison of temperature projections based on
the scenarios of Lomborg, which depend largely on his
extreme assumptions about post-2030 emissions, with
RCP8.5 cannot be reasonably presented as an investigation
into ‘the temperature reduction impact of major climate pol-
icy proposals implemented by 2030’.
Notes
1. Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%
20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20
Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf [Accessed
10 November 2015].
2. Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%
20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf [Accessed 10 November
2015].
3. Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%
20Documents/China/1/China’s%20INDC%20-%20on%2030%20June%20
2015.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2015].
References
G€utschow, J., Jeffery, L., Alexander, R., Hare, B., Schaeffer, M., Rocha, M.
et al. (2015) ‘INDCs lower projected warming to 2.7°C: signiﬁcant
progress but still above 2°C’, Climate Action Tracker Update [online].
Available from: http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/
CAT_global_temperature_update_October_2015.pdf [Accessed 10
November 2015].
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [T. F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K.
Plattner, M. Tignor, S. K. Allen, J. Boschung et al. (eds)] (2013) Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
International Energy Agency (2015) ‘Energy and Climate Change’, World
Energy Outlook Special Brieﬁng for COP21 [online]. Available from:
http://www.iea.org/media/news/WEO_INDC_Paper_Final_WEB.PDF
[Accessed 10 November 2015].
Author Information
Robert E.T. Ward, policy and communications director at
the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment and the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Eco-
nomics and Policy at London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science. He has previously worked as a policy specialist
and journalist, and is a Fellow of the Geological Society. This
work was supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council [grant number ES/K006576/1].
© 2016 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2016) 7:1
Robert Ward126
